

DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY: 735017  
DATE: 7/23

Operational Report  
Lessons Learned  
Headquarters 6/27th Artillery  
Period Ending 31 Jul 1967

27TH ARTILLERY, 6TH AVN BATT 31 JULY 1967

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COL HAYWARD, DACORS, G3  
RECORD COPY-RETURN TO AVHGC-DST

AVHGC-DST (5 Aug 67) 4th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1967 (RCS USFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96175 2 NOV 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPROP-OT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (ALSA) as indorsed.

2. (U) Concur with basic report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

cc: HC, 6th Bn, 27th Arty  
HC, II 277

MFR: ORLL was not staffed due to lack of unresolved problem areas.

ACTION OFFICER: MAJOR BARK

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 6TH BATTALION 27TH INFANTRY  
APO 96289

AVGE-YC

5 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

THRU: Commanding Officer  
23d Artillery Group  
APO 96289

Commanding General  
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery  
ATTN: AVPB-PA-C  
APO 96277

Commanding General  
United States Army Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHGC-DH  
APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief  
United States Army Pacific  
ATTN: GPOP-OT  
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C., 20310

SECTION I


SIGNIFICANT HEADQUARTERS OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

- 1. (C) Administration and Personnel.

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a. The 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery remained assigned to the 23d Artillery Group. Battery "B", 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery has been detached from the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery as described in asterisk explanation in paragraph 1 (c) below.

b. Normal S-1 activities have been conducted during the period 1 May 1967 through 31 July 1967.

c. Personnel strength of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery on 31 July 1967 was:

UNIT	TOE AUTH			ASSIGNED		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
Headquarters Battery	22	1	146	18	1	163
"A" Battery	4	0	110	3	0	109
"B" Battery	3	0	110	NVAL	NVAL	NVAL
"C" Battery	4	0	110	3	0	112
Service Battery	3	3	68	2	3	75
TOTALS	36	4	544	26	4	459
TOTALS (less TOE Battery "B"*)	33	4	434	26	4	459

\* Battery "B", 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery attached to 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery for administration and logistics under the provision of para 1, GO 6524, HQ USARV, dtd 27 November 1964. All personnel and financial records of service members assigned to Battery "B" are located in the personnel section, 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery.


d. There are no critical MOS shortages.

e. Personnel changes during this quarter include:

GAINS:	OFF	WO	EM	LOSSES:	OF	WO	EM
	6	1	54		8	1	40

Page 2 of 15 Pages

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AVGE-YC . 5 August 1967  
 SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSPOR-65) (U)

f. Casualties included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Killed in Action	3
Wounded in Action	18
Missing in Action	0
Non Battle Dead	0
Non Battle Casualties	2

g. Awards and Decorations presented to members of this command included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Silver Star	0
Legion of Merit	1
Bronze Star (Valor)	3
Bronze Star (Merit)	6
Air Medal (Merit)	0
Air Medal (Oak Leaf Cluster)	18
Commendation Medal (Valor)	28
Commendation Medal (Merit)	6
Purple Heart	21

h. R&R Program schedules include the following:

(1) The in-country R&R consisting of the three-day passes to Vung Tau have been utilized by 17 personnel.

(2) The out-of-country R&R included the following five-day and seven day quotas:

Page 3 of 15 Pages

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DECLASSIFIED  
 AUTHORITY  
 DATE 7/23

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AVGE-YC  
 SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSPOR-65) (U) -- 5 August 1967

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bangkok	7	7	4	18
Tokyo	5	3	5	13
Manila	1	1	1	3
Hong Kong	5	3	5	13
*Taipei	2	2	2	6
Singapore	0	1	1	2
Kuala Lumpur	1	0	1	2
Penang	1	2	1	4
Hawaii	5	7	5	17

i. Unit mail clerks pick-up and deliver mail from the nearest APO. APO numbers for the units are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>APO</u>
Headquarters Battery	96289
Battery "A"	96289
Battery "B"	96289
Battery "C"	96289
Service Battery	96491

j. Judicial and Non-Judicial actions by units included:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ARTICLE 15</u>	<u>SUMMARY COURT</u>	<u>SPECIAL COURT</u>	<u>GENERAL COURT</u>
Headquarters Battery	11	1	1	0
Battery "A"	13	0	0	0
*Battery "B"	NVAL	NVAL	NVAL	NVAL
Battery "C"	7	1	2	0
Service Battery	4	0	0	0

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 AUTHORITY  
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- 5 August 1967

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\*Battery "B", 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery attached to 2d Battalion, 916th Artillery for administration and logistics under the provisions of para 1, GO 6524, HQ USARV, dated 27 November 1966.

k. Pertinent medical service statistics include:

Total patient visits (unit personnel)	918
Admitted to hospital	34
Evacuated within the country	31
Evacuated out-of-country	5
Malaria cases	0

l. Reportable accidents included:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VEHICLE</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
Headquarters Battery	0	1	0
Battery "A"	1	0	2
Battery "B"	NVAL	NVAL	NVAL
Battery "D"	2	0	0
Service Battery	0	0	0

m. The morale of the command is outstanding.

n. Educational opportunities for personnel are provided by USAFI extension courses.

o. Religious services, both Protestant and Catholic, are held on a regular weekly basis.

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NND 735017  
AUTHORITY  
DATE 7/23

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- 5 August 1967

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2. (C) Intelligence: Security Inspections and Counterintelligence Briefings have continued throughout the reporting period and have resulted in a definite improvement in the knowledge and understanding of these aspects of military life by all personnel.

3. (C) Training.

a. This Battalion continues to administer Specialist's Test for gun section personnel, Fire Direction Center personnel and all incoming Company Grade Officers.

b. Weapons instruction and familiarization for all assigned personnel on the M-16 rifle has been completed in preparation for transition to the new rifle. The Battalion continues to familiarize with all organic weapons monthly.

c. Annual familiarization classes on Geneva Convention were completed on 22 June 1967 and attendance rosters were submitted to the Personnel Officer for entries on form 66's and form 20's.

d. New in-country arrivals continue to be sent to 1st Infantry Division Jungle Devil School. The Battalion presently has five (5) students attending the school. A total of thirty-four (34) EM have completed this course during the reporting period.


e. The following periods of mandatory training were conducted during the reporting period:

- (1) Command Information . . . . . 3 Hours
- (2) Character Guidance . . . . . 3 Hours
- (3) Combat Intelligence . . . . . 2 Hours
- (4) Geneva Convention . . . . . 1 Hour
- (5) Personal Hygiene . . . . . 1 Hour
- (6) Escape and Evasion . . . . . 1 Hour
- (7) CBR . . . . . 1 Hour
- (8) Anti-Infiltration and Anti-Guerilla Warfare . . . . . 1 Hour
- (9) Weapons Proficiency . . . . . 6 Hours

f. Battalion Staff and Fire Direction Center personnel attended a four (4) hour FADAC orientation course at IIFF artillery during the reporting period.

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- 5 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

g. Five (5) maintenance personnel from the Battalion attended a three day course of instruction on the carrier cargo, M548 at Tay Ninh. Upon completion of the course, personnel that attended the course, instructed other personnel of their respective units on the operation and maintenance of the M548.

#### 4. (C) Operations.

a. Normal operations, consistent with Battalion mission, were conducted during the reporting period.

b. The following operations were supported by the Battalion during the reporting period:

(1) Operation Dallas: A brigade sized, road clearing and search and destroy operation in South West Phu Gio Sub Sector. Battery "C" GSR 1/5 Artillery, 1st Infantry Division Artillery from 16 May 67 to 25 May 67.

(2) Operation Billings: A multibrigade operation North of Phuoc Vinh and South of Quan Loi. Batteries "A" and "C" provided GSR fires to 1st Infantry Division Artillery, 1st Infantry Division from 11 June 67 to 26 June 67. A total of 2458 rounds of heavy artillery were fired in support of this operation.

(3) Operation Pikesville: An operation conducted by Detachment B-56 (Sigma) 5th Special Forces (Abn) in the area West of Quan-Loi to the Cambodian border. Battery "A" provided supporting fires from 6 June 67 through 1 July 67.

(4) Resupply Convoy to Phuoc Vinh: Battery "C" GSR to 1/5 Artillery, 1st Infantry Division Artillery from 24 May 67 to 1 June 67.

c. During the reporting period Batteries "A" and "C" displaced a total of seven (7) times to attack targets outside of range capabilities and better support operations conducted in and around their areas of responsibility.

d. The Battalion continues its extensive support to all Special Forces Camps within range of its weapons.

(1) A minimum of one liaison visit every two weeks is made to each camp. The close liaison permits the transfer of operational requirements and recent intelligence. Liaison visits are made to the "B" team Headquarters at Song Be and An Loc in addition to the liaison visits to the "A" teams.

(2) The Battalion S-3 made presentations on Artillery tactics and techniques to include the adjustment of artillery at each of the supported camps.

## CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7 of N Pages

DECLASSIFIED  
 AUTHORITY  
 DATE 7/23

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVGE-YC

5 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSPOR-65) (U)

(3) The Battalion Survey team has completed position area survey at all supported Special Forces Camps. Each of the supported camps have received a chart on a scale 1:6250 showing all surveyed locations, a terrain sketch, all defensive concentrations and the necessary information to obtain artillery support (eg. Call sign and frequency of units within range).

(4) All defensive concentrations for the camps were planned in coordination with the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery and have been fired in where possible.

e. The Battalion Survey team surveyed each field location occupied by the batteries. Alternate positions for each battery have also been surveyed.

f. The Battalion continued to control fires of 105mm and 4.2" mortar batteries for the defense of Phuoc Vinh base camp during the absence of the Direct Support Artillery Headquarters. The Battalion conducts daily "Do not load" counter mortar firing to test reaction time of all units. These daily exercises have decreased reaction times for all units.

g. The Battalion experienced three mortar attacks on Phuoc Vinh on 12 and 13 May 67. The Battalion was controlling artillery fires at Phuoc Vinh.

(1) The first attack (120207H) lasted 10 minutes and about fifty (50) rounds were received. The airstrip at Phuoc Vinh and the aircraft nearby received extensive damage.

(2) The second attack (130030H) delivered about 250 mortar rounds into Phuoc Vinh.

(3) The third mortar attack (132100H) was received just as the Battalion was firing a live practice counter mortar program. It is felt that the live firing of the program prematurely triggered the attack. Battalion suffered 2 WIA.

h. "A" Battery of the Battalion experienced mortar attacks on 11 and 14 Jul 67.

(1) In the coordinated attack on 110126H Jul 67 extensive damage was inflicted in the Battery area. The damage was inflicted by both mortars, recoilless rifle, and satchel charges thrown by infiltrators. The Battery received enemy fire for almost three hours. The Battery suffered 6 WIA.

(2) In the second attack (142236H Jul) which was mortar attack only, the Battery suffered 1 KIA and 3 WIA. The attack lasted less than forty-five minutes.

Page 8 of N Pages

## CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
 AUTHORITY  
 DATE 3/23

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGE-TC  
 SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-45) (U) 5 August 1967

i. The Battalion experienced a coordinated rocket/mortar attack on Phuoc Vinh on 270030H Jul 67. The 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery was again controlling the artillery fires at Phuoc Vinh. The counter mortar/rocket program was fired within two minutes of receipt of the first rounds. The counter mortar program and the targets fired on receipt of data from Air Observers was effective to the point of inflicting casualties on the enemy. This was verified by body count the next day.

j. The following number of missions were fired with total amounts of ammunition listed below:

	Number of Missions Fired	Ammo Expended		Total
		8"	175mm	
"A" Battery:	6373	6193	7671	13,864
"C" Battery:	8094	10,118	6785	16,903
BN (-) Total:	14,467	16,311	14,456	30,767

k. The Battalion commemorated its 100,000th round fired in RVN on 23 May 1967.


5. (C) Logistics: PSP is a controlled item and no longer available for ammo storage areas and bunkers, however, as long as lumber is easily obtained there is no immediate problem.

6. (C) Aviation.

The following aviation missions, listed by sorties, were flown during this quarter:

	Cmd & Control	Recon	Arty Adjust	PAX	Cargo (Tons)	Hours
ROTARY WING	152	60	31	112	.5	136:15
FIXED WING	77	115	52	38	1.0	244:45
TOTALS	229	175	83	150	1.5	381:00

Of the 381:00 hours flown during the period, 289:00 hours were utilized for visual recon and artillery adjustment, 76% of the total flown. Ninety-two hours (92:00) were flown for command and control and resupply of maintenance parts, 24% of total.



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AVGE-YC 5 August 1967  
 SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

### 7. (C) Civic Actions.

a. The Battalion Medical Section conducted eleven MEDCAPS during the reporting period. Approximately 440 patients were treated in the village of Nuoc Vang vicinity XT994517.

b. The Battalion continued to sponsor the Phuoc Vinh Elementary School. Personnel from the Battalion repaired classroom furniture, painted classrooms, the school exterior, cut grass and policed the school yard.

c. Sergeant Vu Nhu Son, the Battalion Interpreter, continued his teaching of English to the villagers of Phuoc Vinh. Sgt Son is also teaching Vietnamese to personnel of this Battalion.

d. Construction was completed on the hospital at Nuoc Vang. This project was done by both the villagers and Battalion personnel.

### 8. (C) Communications. No Comment.

## SECTION II

### PART I, OBSERVATIONS (C)

#### 1. (U) Personnel and Administration.

NONE

#### 2. (C) Intelligence.

##### a. (C) ITEM: Limited Time for Visual Reconnaissance.

(1) DISCUSSION: During the rainy season an average of five hours per day is suitable for aerial observation due to the fog and low clouds and fast moving rain storms. Close coordination is required to obtain maximum benefit from the few hours available and still meet registration requirements.

(2) OBSERVATION: Maximum use of daylight H&I should be made to offset the lack of observation during these periods.

##### b. (C) ITEM: Shortage of O-1 Aircraft

DISCUSSION: The requirement to visually reconnoiter approximately 2000 square kilometers of area with only one O-1 aircraft makes it extremely important to maintain accurate current intelligence to insure the best utilization of the one aircraft. Even two aircraft are insufficient to cover the area of responsibility.

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AVGE-YC  
 SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSPOR-65) (U) 5 August 1967

c. (C) ITEM: Need for Expanded Sniffer Program

(1) DISCUSSION: Both the 1st Infantry Division and this Battalion have encountered considerable success with the conduct of Sniffer flights. The 1st Division does not provide complete coverage of all areas of interest within this Battalion's range capability nor does this Battalion have the aircraft assets to support a satisfactory Sniffer program. It is further felt that it is inefficient to use fixed wing aircraft to accomplish this type of mission.

(2) OBSERVATION: Recommend that a systematic Sniffer flight program be initiated by II Field Force to include areas outside of the areas of Divisional interest to provide more complete coverages.

d. (C) ITEM: Need for Extensive Ground Reconnaissance

(1) DISCUSSION: This Battalion received much valuable target information while a Special Forces Sigma Detachment operated for approximately thirty (30) days within this unit's range capability conducting reconnaissance throughout the entire area.

(2) OBSERVATION: Based on the results obtained by the Special Forces Sigma while operating in the Phuoc Vinh - Quan Loi areas, recommend that a more extensive and continuing ground reconnaissance program be initiated.

3. (U) Training and Organization.

NONE

4. (C) Operations.

a. (C) ITEM: Base Camp Defense

(1) DISCUSSION: Confusion existed as to control of defenses during the 110126H July attack on Quan Loi. The confusion resulted from the frequent changes in the defense plan as tenant maneuver Battalions changed. Changes occurred about every three weeks. Additionally the Battery interior guard/security plan in base camp was inadequate.

(2) OBSERVATION: The Base Camp Commander should be responsible for base camp defenses thus preventing basic changes to the scheme of defense as caretaker units change. Batteries, even in base camp must have a well organized and active interior guard to prevent infiltration.

b. (C) ITEM: Centralized FDC

(1) DISCUSSION: Based on ten months experience operating a centralized FDC, technical control of gun data was decentralized to the firing batteries. During the ten months the Battalion experienced difficulty in manpower utilization, personnel training, communications, and reaction time. It is felt that accurate and timely fire can be delivered by the batteries without technical supervision from the Battalion.

CONFIDENTIAL  
 Page 11 of 15 Pages

DECLASSIFIED  
 AUTHORITY  
 E.O. 13526 DATE 7/23

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AVGE-YC

5 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSPOR-65) (U)

(a) The manpower required to run a technical Battalion FDC is a definite problem. Two shifts consisting of one computer and two chart operators per battery, a chief computer, and a FDO are required to effectively do the jobs. These personnel can be better utilized in Battery FDC's.

(b) Training the large numbers of personnel required to man the technical FDC is impractical in combat.

(c) Land line was used to only one battery. The VHF sole-user circuit and FM radio communications used to control the fires of a second battery are not secure enough or reliable enough to be used as channels for technical data.

(d) The additional check at Battalion level increases the reaction time of fire missions.

(e) With firing batteries separated by long distances, only the fires of the four (4) 175mm guns and two (2) 8" Howitzers can be massed and only in a relatively small area of range overlap.

(2) OBSERVATION: Decentralized FDC affords greater flexibility and quicker reaction.

c. (C) ITEM: Wire in the Defense

(1) DISCUSSION: All external wire communication and approximately 75% of the internal communication were lost in the mortar/rocket attack on 270030H July as shrapnel cut the overhead wire in the area.

(2) OBSERVATION: Wire should be dug in to a depth of twelve (12) inches to prevent interruption of communications by other than a direct hit.

d. (C) ITEM: Need for a Material to Insure a Stabilized Firing Position During the Wet Season

DISCUSSION: Presently, the spades of the 175mm gun and the 8" Howitzer are emplaced in laterite. This material does not possess the resilient properties necessary to provide a stabilized firing position. After three or four rounds have been fired it is frequently necessary to re-lay the piece due to displacement in the soft laterite. Several possibilities are being pursued to resolve this problem to include the use of a berm, a gravel pit for hardening and draining and chemical agents for hardening the wet laterite.

e. (C) ITEM: 8" Howitzer Artillery Requirement at Quan Loi

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AVGE-YC

5 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

(1) DISCUSSION: Evaluation of the friendly dispositions in the Quan Loi area as well as the past requirements for 8" Howitzer support has revealed that the arrival of the 105mm units at Quan Loi has in large part negated the justification for an 8" platoon at that location.

(2) OBSERVATION: In order to provide better artillery fire support to the eight Special Forces Comps within "A" Battery's range capabilities, recommend that the 8" platoon be converted to a 175mm platoon.

f. (C) ITEM: Increased Support for Special Forces Comos.

(1) DISCUSSION: This Battalion has the mission to provide artillery support to those Special Forces Comps within its range capabilities. The Special Forces Comps utilize a "one time Secret Pad" for passing information and use an "Operational Summary" for informing their "C" teams of their future operations.

(2) OBSERVATION: In order to provide better artillery support to the Special Forces Comps within the Battalion's range capabilities, recommend that the "one time Secret Pad" and the operational summaries be provided to the supporting artillery Battalion to expedite the exchange of operational and intelligence information.

5. (C) Logistics.

a. (C) ITEM: Aerial Supply of Ordnance Parts.

(1) DISCUSSION: Aerial supply of ordnance parts is a necessity to maintain equipment in an operational status. The direct support ordnance company has not been able to provide this service on a regular and continuing basis. As a result, this Battalion has been compelled to locate and provide transportation for delivery of parts.

(2) OBSERVATION: The direct support company should be provided the necessary aircraft support to insure regular delivery of essential parts.

b. (C) ITEM: Lack of Readily Available High Mortality Third Echelon Repair Parts.

(1) DISCUSSION: High mortality third (3d) echelon repair parts are not readily available. Examples of parts which should be maintained in a 3d Echelon PLL include primary carriers, hydraulic motors, and snare cylinder hoses.

(2) OBSERVATION: Recommend that contact teams maintain a PLL on high mortality 3d echelon repair parts.

Page 13 of 15 Pages

# CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
 NND 735617  
 AUTHORITY  
 61 NARA DATE 7/22

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGE-YC

5 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational-Report-Lessons Learned-(RCS-CRFOR-65) (U)

c. (C) ITEM: Insufficient Ammunition Storage Space in Forward Areas.

(1) DISCUSSION: The Ammunition storage area presently available to this unit is insufficient to maintain adequate stockage levels between convoys. Therefore, costly aerial resupply has become a necessity to continue this unit's tactical mission.

(2) OBSERVATION: Recommend that the ASP at Quan Loi be expanded or additional space be allotted to this unit to permit storage of ten thousand (10,000) rounds of 8"/175mm ammunition.

SECTION II

PART II, RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) Personnel and Administration

NONE

2. (U) Intelligence

NONE

3. (U) Training and Organization

NONE

4. (C) Operations

In the light of recent mortar/rocket attacks on base camps recommend:

a. That a large volume weapon such as the M91, 115mm multiple rocket launcher be introduced into the theater and allocated to base camps. The M91 with a HE warhead would provide the required fire power to effectively deliver counter-rocket fire. Multiple rocket launchers could be maintained in base camp areas and laid on most likely areas. In the event of a rocket attack the M91 would be laid and fired on the first available date. To increase the probability of success a mixture of HE and CS warheads could be fired.

b. That living quarters be hardened by some kind of overhead protection to reduce first round injuries. A solution would be two (2) layers of sandbags on a wooden or engineer stake and PSP platform just above each bunk.

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DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY  
DATE

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AVGE-YC

5 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-45) (U)

c. That heavy artillery be parapeted similar to light artillery in order to afford some measure of protection to the crew and weapon and also to afford a fighting position for the crew should the perimeter be breached. To accomplish adequate parapets for heavy artillery there is a definite need for Engineer support.

*Robert J. Haras*  
ROBERT J. HARAS  
LTC, Artillery  
Commanding

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AVGE-C 1st Ind  
 SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RC-GSFOR-65) UIC: WAISAA (U)

Department of the Army, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, APO 96289,  
 20 August 1967

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, Artillery, ATTN: AVFB-FAC,  
 APO 96266

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery is approved.
2. (U) Section II, Part I, paragraph 2a. Concur.
3. (C) Section II, Part I, paragraph 2b. Concur. Reallocation of aviation assets within the Group has provided an additional O-1 Aircraft daily to the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery. In an emergency it is possible to obtain the use of additional aircraft from sources outside the Group.
4. (U) Section II, Part I, paragraph 2c. Concur.
5. (C) Section II, Part I, paragraph 2d. Concur. This headquarters fully appreciates the intelligence and targeting value of participating in operations of the "SIGMA" variety.
6. (C) Section II, Part I, paragraph 4e. Concur. Provided the ceiling on 175mm tubes permits, this headquarters considers a 175mm battery at Quan Loi would better accomplish the mission.
7. (C) Section II, Part I, paragraph 4f. Concur. Arrangements have already been made for the battalion to receive copies of the B-Team Operational Summaries. This headquarters is coordinating with A Company, 5th Special Forces Group to arrange a method for the battalion to receive coded messages from Special Forces Camps.
8. (C) Section II, Part I, paragraph 5. Concur. At present this headquarters coordinates aerial resupply of parts utilizing any aircraft resources available. A more responsive and consistent system would decrease down time due to needed parts.
9. (U) Section II, Part I, paragraph 5b. Concur.
10. (C) Section II, Part I, paragraph 5c. Concur. This headquarters has contacted the 1st Infantry Division Engineer concerning an expanded consolidated ammunition storage area at Quan Loi. The Division is presently studying the ammunition storage situation.
11. (C) Section II, Part II, paragraph 4a. This headquarters does not have the information available to properly evaluate the recommendation.

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AUTHORITY  
E.O. 13526, DATE 7/23

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AVGE-C 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RC-CSFOR-65) UIC: WALSAA (U)

12. (U) Section II, Part II, paragraph 4b. Concur. Subordinate units have been instructed to begin hardening all living quarters to provide overhead protection.

13. (U) Section II, Part II, paragraph 4c. Concur. The recommendation is already the policy of this command. Permanent parapets can best be constructed utilizing engineer support, however units must be able to construct parapets with their own resources, if necessary.

ROBERT J KOCH  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

DOWNGRADED A-1 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

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AVFB-PAC (5 Aug 67) 2nd Ind  
 SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

DA, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96266

FRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN:  
 AVHCO-DH, APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN:  
 GPCF-CF, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department  
 of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (VIC:WA18AA), adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

2. (C) The following comments pertain to Section II, Part I of the report:

a. Paragraph 2c. Concur. This headquarters is currently investigating the possibility of expanding this program on a corps wide basis.

b. Paragraph 2d. Concur.

c. Paragraph 4e. Higher headquarters has placed a limitation on number of 175 tubes to be utilized within III Corps Tactical Zone. These tubes are allocated based on changing operational requirements.

d. Paragraph 4f. Concur. The unit is now receiving the necessary Special Forces codes.

e. Paragraph 5b. Concur. Recommend that contact teams keep a record of demand data so that the ASL at the BSU will include high mortality third echelon parts.


f. Paragraph 5c. Nonconcur. Present storage capacity is considered sufficient to meet ammo requirements at Quan Loi. Resupply of Class V by air is adequate when the road to Quan Loi is not open.

3. (C) The following comments pertain to Section II, Part II:

a. Paragraph 4a. Concur. This headquarters, in a recent reply to a USARV request for information on measures for improving defense against rocket/mortar attacks, suggested that consideration be given to the employment of the M91, 115mm Multiple Rocket Launcher for base camp defense. The

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AVFB-PAC (5 Aug 67)


SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

present system employs only a toxic chemical round. Consideration should be given for the development of an HE round for this system. COMUSMACV has recently indicated interest in the M91 Rocket Launcher. A study to determine the feasibility of employment in RVN is contemplated in the near future.

b. Paragraph 4b and 4c. Concur. This headquarters continually urges adoption of these policies.

RAYMOND P. MURPHY  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

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AVFBC-H 3d Ind  
 SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 6th Battalion, 27th  
 Artillery, 31 July 1967 (RGS GSPOR-65) (U)

BA, HQ II PFORGEV, APO San Francisco 96266 19 SEP 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVFBC-DH, APO 96375  
 Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-MH, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army,  
 Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.
2. This command concurs with the recommendations of the basic report as modified by the 2d indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
 nc

R. E. WANGSNESS  
 CPT, AGC  
 1st AG

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 When Separated From  
 Classified Inclosures

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