

CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257RG 472
11th ACR ACRHS 5-3
APKs
Dec 67 - Sep 69
Box 2

AVIC-WE

21 Oct 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report of Enemy Attacks in Northern BINH LONG Province, 10 - 13 August 1969.

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

Transmitted herewith is the Combat After Action Report of the Battle of Northern BINH LONG Province, the enemy attacks against 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment installations and fire support bases during Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 CG, USARV
- 1 CG, IIFV
- 3 CG, MACV
- 1 USAAS
- 1 USAIS
- 1 USACAS
- 2 ACS FOR
- 1 USAAFMC
- 1 USAAMIS
- 1 US Military Academy
- 1 CO, 11th ACR
- 1 XO, 11th ACR
- 1 Staff, 11th AC
- 3 CO, 28th MHD, 11th ACR

W. Ralph Hill
W. RALPH HILL
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

CONFIDENTIAL

1. (U) REFERENCES AND SOURCES:

- a. 11th ACR INTSUMS 223-69 to 225-69 (110001H Aug 69 to 132400H Aug 69).
- b. 11th ACR SITREPS 110001H Aug 69 to 132400 Aug 69.
- c. FRAGO 15 to OPOD 6-69 (Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR).
- d. S-3, 11th ACR Radio Log (0001 12 Aug to 2400 13 Aug 1969).
- e. Taped interviews with personnel who were original source material.
- f. Notes and discussions with personnel who were secondary source material.

2. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: The Battle of Northern BINH LONG Province, which took place during Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR.

3. (U) INCLUSIVE DATES OF OPERATION: 11 - 13 August 1969.

4. (U) LOCATION OF ATTACKS: Within a rectangle bounded by XT7382 (South), XT7514 (North), XT6890 (East), and XT8290 (West).

5. (C) GENERAL:

a. The enemy's plans: According to intelligence sources, the NVA/VC forces sought to seize and hold AN LOC for one day as part of a series of coordinated attacks launching the autumn offensive in an effort to inflict as many US casualties as possible.

An unusually significant aspect was that the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment intelligence received almost complete plans of the attack, and were able to predict almost the hour they would occur.

b. The 11th ACR's response: The First Battalion of the Sixteenth Infantry (Mech) was under the operational control of 11th ACR from 7 August to 20 September, and was given the mission of interdicting and counterattacking the enemy forces west and north of AN LOC. It combined with the Fourth Battalion of the Ninth Infantry (ARVN).

The Second Squadron, 11th ACR (E Troop and H Company) was given the mission of establishing a blocking position west of AN LOC. They combined with the 15th Armored Cavalry (ARVN) and elements of the Ninth Infantry (ARVN).

The First Squadron, 11th ACR and the 34th Rangers (ARVN) plus the local CIDG force, defended LOC NHHH.

CONFIDENTIAL

c. The US/ARVN forces' deployment on the night of the attacks: A Company, 1-16 conducted ground reconnaissance west of FSB EAGLE II as C Company 1-16 and 4/9 Inf (ARVN) moved from EAGLE II to secure FSB ALLIONS II, on the night of August 11/12. E Troop, 2/11 ACR conducted ambush patrols west of AN LOC. The E Troop Command Post and H Company defended FSB ASPEN I; the 15th Cavalry (ARVN) and elements of the 9th Inf. (ARVN) defended FSB SIDEWINDER.

QUAN LOI was defended by elements of the First Air Cavalry Division and the 11th ACR. The 11th ACR had a platoon from Second Squadron, nine ACAVs from First Squadron, three tanks and the Headquarters Troop as a reaction force for QUAN LOI. AN LOC was defended by the Second of the Ninth Infantry (ARVN) and the 214th Regional Forces Company. LOC NINH was defended by the 1/11 ACR and the 34th Ranger Battalion.

d. The attacks: In the early morning hours of 12 August QUAN LOI, FSB SIDEWINDER, ASPEN I, LOC NINH and FSB JON received mortars and/or rockets, followed by ground probes. FSB SIDEWINDER was overrun, but the other installations fought off the attacks. A small VC squad entered the east gate of AN LOC and passed out propaganda leaflets.

e. The counterattacks: TF 1-16, E Troop and H Company, 2/11 ACR and the 9th Inf and 15th Cavalry (ARVN) moved to counterattack on 12 August, and had several contacts which continued through 13 August. The First Squadron's contacts continued through 13 August.

6. (U) ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT:

a. Intelligence summary: This begins 6 August and continues through 11 August. It gives enemy plans, unit identifications, location, and general situation of NVA/VC forces on the 11th.

b. TF 1-16 journal: This is the account of TF 1-16 from 7 August until 12 August. (1-16 Inf (Mech) was OPCON to 11th ACR from 7 August).

c. The attacks: Each attack is reported in detail.

- (1) QUAN LOI
- (2) AN LOC
- (3) FSB SIDEWINDER
- (4) FSB ASPEN I
- (5) LOC NINH

d. The counterattacks:

- (1) TF 1-16
- (2) E/2/11 ACR
- (3) H/2/11 ACR

CONFIDENTIAL

7. (C) INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY:

a. General: From 24 July to 6 August, enemy activity was limited mainly to reconnaissance. There were occasional mortar or rocket attacks and mining incidents along with some small-scale ground probes which tested defenses. However, there was significant activity, and the newspapers wrote frequently of the "lull".

On or about 6 August enemy forces moved from secure base areas in or near Cambodia to forward positions throughout BINH LONG Province, increasing the level of activity in the area of operations. This movement, which was rapidly detected, resulted in numerous contacts, ralliers, prisoners and captured enemy documents. Thus, military intelligence soon had the plans, probable areas of operation and unit identification of the enemy forces.

b. Unit identification:

(1) 9th VC Division:

a. 272d VC Regiment: On July 28, 1969, C Company, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry (C/5-7), which was OPCON to TF 1-16 engaged a small enemy force at XT 715758, killed two NVA and captured documents taken from the bodies which identified the 271st and 272d VC Regiments. This provided the first indication of 9th VC Division activity.

Nguyen Van An rallied to the 214th Regional Forces at BINH NINH on 31 July. After two days of interrogation An identified himself as the platoon leader of the M21 Sapper Reconnaissance Company, 272d VC Regiment since 1964. According to An, about 20 June 1969, elements of all four main force divisions moved into Cambodia, with the 7th NVA and 9th VC Divisions in the Fishhook area.

After this relocation the Divisions sent reconnaissance units to targets in the III Corps area. These units returned about 20 July to discuss the Allied situation. The battalion commanders of the reconnaissance elements of the 271st and 272d VC Regiments accompanied their respective battalions to the AN LOC area to refine their original analysis. An was with the K6 Battalion Commander, 272d VC Regiment, as the elements selected assembly areas, staging areas and avenues of approach. An's knowledge of the attack plans came from his association with the battalion commander.

An stated that the 272d VC Regiment would leave its Cambodian base area, cross the Saigon river near XT5696, and move along a trail that runs east-southeast to an assembly area near XT6696, between the Prek Kong and Ton Le streams. The 271st VC Regiment would cross the Cambodian border near XT5890 and proceed parallel to the 272d VC Regiments, to establish blocking positions between LANG BAY (XT 705855) and LANG SAU (XT 690878). The 272d VC Regiment would move into the rubber near AP PHU LO (XT6890) 24 to 36 hours after arriving in BINH LONG Province. The D368 Local Force (LF) Battalion would join the 272d VC Regiment near BINH PHU (XT715887).

CONFIDENTIAL

The K4 and K5 Battalions, 272d VC Regiment, plus the D368 LF Battalion were to attack AN LOC from the west, with supporting attacks from the north and south.

The 25th Sapper Company, 272d VC Regiment, had the mission of taking BINH PHU, with a 15 to 20 minute mortar and/or rocket barrage preceding the attack. The mortars would be located near BINH NINH.

The 9th VC Division's plan was to seize and hold AN LOC for one day. An stated that he heard the 7th NVA Division would launch attacks against QUAN LOI, LOI NINH and BU DOP at the same time. The 88th NVA Regiment, 9th VC Division, and the 1st NVA Division would be responsible for TAY NINH Province.

Nguyen Van Sen, an ARVN soldier until his abduction by a local VC Force Squad in July 1968, rallied to the 399th Regional Forces at TAN HUNG (XT 863876) on 2 August 1969. Sen became a member of the 16 man Propaganda Section of Xa Xo 28/Xa Co Xit Local Force. This unit's mission, besides propaganda, was to tax AP HUNG PHAT (Xa Co 28) at XT 858848, and AP HUNG YEN (Xa Co Xit) at XT 890863. Sen's basecamp was located south of SUIO HEO, near XT9286, about a half-hour's walk from SUIO HEO.

On 15 July 1969, two companies from the 9th VC Division visited Sen's basecamp. Sen was told by his section leader, Bav Tien, that the companies' mission was to reconnoiter the area. The two companies set up a basecamp and remained near there until late July. Sen talked with members of these units on three occasions. During one of these meetings Sen was told that the entire 9th VC Division would come to the area. He heard that they left the basecamp on 1 August and travelled in the direction of SOC TRANH.

On 1 August, 40 to 50 men from the D368 LF Battalion rested in Sen's basecamp for 7 hours. When they departed, they headed toward SOC TRANH. Each of the units asked directions to SOC TRANH, Sen stated.

b. 271st VC Regiment: While conducting a bomb-damage assessment mission on August 9, the Aero-Rifle Platoon (ARPs), 11th ACR, captured Ngo Kuang Tri at XT 605905. Tri, a member of C6, K2, F51 (also known as C6 Company, K2 Battalion, 271st VC Regiment), said that the K2 Battalion moved to the "fishhook" area on 28 July 1969, and remained there until two days prior to his capture. On 1800 hours, the C6 Company received orders to send four men to Battalion Headquarters by 0400 hours, 9 August.

Tri and 3 other men left the C6 basecamp at 0340 hours, 9 August and travelled east until they arrived at battalion headquarters by 0400 hours. These 4 and 12 others (4 from each of the other three companies) were briefed by the battalion commander and given the mission of finding a secure area for their respective companies. It is possible that these safe areas were to be used after the 12 August attacks.

Tri and the other 15 men left the battalion headquarters at 0600 hours and proceeded west with enough rice for 9 days. Two hours later the group was spotted; however, Tri was the only one captured. The PW heard from various members of the 16 man group that their unit was to attack an undisclosed area in the near future.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) 7th NVA Division:

a. General: During the period of 6 August to 16 August, the 209th NVA Regiment was identified in contacts near LOC NINH. The 141st NVA Regiment was unidentified and at least one battalion may have participated in engagements northeast of LOC NINH, while the remainder of the Regiment was northeast of AN LOC. The 165th NVA Regiment also avoided identification; however, it was believed to be in the BO DUC-BU DOP area.

b. 209th NVA Regiment: Nguyen Van Thien rallied to the 11th Popular Forces Platoon at XU 716050 on August 3, 1969. Thien, assistant platoon leader of the C21 Sapper Reconnaissance Company, 209th NVA Regiment, had been wounded in the leg on July 27, when F Troop, 2/11 ACR, engaged 4 and killed one at XU 726035. (Documents found on the body identified the C21 Sapper Reconnaissance Company, 209th NVA Regiment).

Thien had managed to avoid capture, but his wound had become worse and he rallied. Although he changed his story several times, the following account remained unchanged throughout the questioning: Thien and 7 other men were briefed by the C21 Commander on July 26. They were told to reconnoiter two areas, SOC 10 (possibly village 10 at XT 710102) and a road junction along QL 13 (possibly at XT 739045). Thien, the assistant company commander and another man were to discover the size, strength, and position of the outpost at village 10. The other four men were to reconnoiter a road junction along QL 13 to find a position which a battalion could ambush an armored column. Both groups were to return to their basecamp near Bridge 40 to report their findings by July 29.

Thien's group was told that 5 to 6 days after their return the K7 Battalion would attack SOC 10, while the K8 Battalion ambushed an armored column (possibly to interdict reinforcements from QUAN LOI).

(3) 101D NVA Regiment: The Air Cavalry Troop, 11th ACR, killed 41 NVA and captured 6 POWs at XT 605905 on 9 August. Five of the prisoners were from K7 F12, also known as K7 Battalion, 101D NVA Regiment. Hoang Van Khe, a master sergeant in the Signal Platoon of K7, was told that K7 had been given the mission of ambushing armored convoys (Khe was told this by his platoon leader, but was not told where the ambushes would occur, but he believed that they would be along QL 13). The K7 Battalion was enroute to the mission site when it was hit by a B-52 strike at 1630 hours August 8. Khe was told that K7 had aborted the mission and would remain dispersed in the area to re-group and resupply.

(4) Other intelligence indicators: The ACT, 11th ACR, detected 25 newly constructed bunkers at XU 687197, near LOC NINH on 9 August. Wide trails, showing recent foot traffic, headed east-southeast at XU 678169, XU 682197, and XU 675154. (1)

(1)

This intelligence summary was based on Annex A (11th ACR SUPINTREP 26-69) dated 17 August 1969. All of the tentative assumptions above were made by personnel of military intelligence of 11th ACR.

CONFIDENTIAL

G. (C) REINFORCEMENT:

a. General: In response to the threat against BINH LONG Province, the 1-16 Inf (Mech) (-), B/1-9 Cavalry, the 34th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) 15th Cavalry Regiment (ARVN), and elements of the 9th Inf Regt (ARVN) moved into the BLACKHORSE area of operation (AO) during early August. Following the series of attacks on 11-13 August, the units remained in the AO to conduct reconnaissance operations.

b. 7 August: On this date II FFORCEV directed the 1-16 Inf (Mech) to leave FSB JIM at XT 882382, move north, and become under the operational control of the 11th ACR. A and C Company, plus the battalion headquarters departed FSB JIM, leaving behind the battalion's reconnaissance platoon and B/2-33 Artillery.

At 1430 hours, 7 August, 1-16 reached LAI KHE and accepted operational control (OPCON) of A Troop, 1-4 Cavalry. This task force (TF) then continued the 30 mile march on Highway 13, stopping briefly at FSB THUNDER III (XT 769 665) to pick up C/2-33 Artillery. Following some difficulty on QL 13 the task force closed FSB ASPEN I at 0330 hours, 8 August.

c. Pre-attack plans: At 0730 hours the same morning, TF 1-16 continued the move to its new AO. One platoon from A Company secured the C/2-33 Artillery at FSB ASPEN I while the unit moved to FSB EAGLE I. At EAGLE I TF 1-16 assumed responsibility for 2/11 ACR's AO, and Howitzer Battery, 2/11 ACR was made OPCON to it. The task force also established a combined command post with 4/9 Inf (ARVN) which was also at FSB EAGLE I.

The 2/11 ACR moved south and occupied FSB ASPEN I, assuming responsibility for a new AO south and southwest of AN LOC.

At 1400 hours the same day TF 1-16 and 4/9 Inf (ARVN) occupied the newly built FSB EAGLE II (XT 745929). This became the headquarters for TF 1-16 Inf and 4/9 Inf (ARVN). The reconnaissance company from 9th Inf (ARVN) assisted TF 1-16 in conducting reconnaissance operations, ambush patrols, and providing security and ready reaction forces for FSBs EAGLE II and THUNDER IV.

On the evening of August 8, an A Company ambush patrol observed movement near its location (XT 724926) and requested a Light Fire Team (LFT) for the contact which developed. Shortly thereafter the enemy broke contact, fading into the dense jungle. Two US soldiers were wounded in the action. FSB EAGLE II received incoming mortar rounds.

On 9 August C Company found two 107mm rounds (XT 719920) while conducting a reconnaissance of the area from which they had received 82mm mortar rounds the evening of 8 August. Searching further, they found 14 bunkers, 24 cubic feet a piece with 1½ feet of overhead cover, 200 feet of communications wire and one more 107mm rocket at XT 721922.

On 10 August an aircraft from the BLACKHORSE Air Cavalry Troop spotted an estimated VC Company in a lightly wooded area (XT 637972) while conducting a visual reconnaissance mission. The ARPs were inserted and later reinforced by C Company and a Company from the 4/9 Inf (ARVN), and the "Blues" of B/1-9 Cavalry.

CONFIDENTIAL

The ARPs immediately seized three NVA Hoi Chanhs, while the US and ARVN forces swept the area and made contact with a company-sized force. The US/ARVN forces maintained heavy organic fire on the enemy positions. As the contact continued, US artillery and tactical air pounded the enemy, but the enemy maintained small-arms fire and automatic AK-47 fire as they withdrew into the jungle. When the contact broke, the Allied forces swept the area and found 31 NVA bodies, 4 POWs, 4 NVA Hoi Chanhs and an assortment of NVA weapons and web-gear. C Company was credited with 4 NVA POWs and 3 NVA killed. Interrogations of the prisoner showed the enemy to be from the 272nd VC Regiment, 9th VC Division and the 58th Artillery Battalion.

On 11 August TF 1-16 lost A Troop, 1-4 Cavalry, which became OPCON to the Third Brigade, First Air Cavalry Division (AM). In return, D Company, 5-7 Cavalry was placed OPCON to TF 1-16. TF 1-16 continued ground reconnaissance to the west of FSB EAGLE II as C Company and 4/9 Inf (ARVN) moved from EAGLE II to secure ALLONS II (XT 728966). This move enabled the Howitzers of How/2/11 ACR, DS to TF 1-16, to fire in support of the First Squadron, 11th ACR at LOC NINH.

9. (C) THE ATTACKS:

a. QUAN LOI: This village and installation squats on a broad hill, fifty meters higher than the valleys which surround it. Beyond the valleys are other hills, not as broad or flat-topped as QUAN LOI. The sides of the QUAN LOI hill are bare, giving it the appearance of a shaved, sun-burnt neck.

Half-way down the sides the line of bunkers begin. Twenty-five meters apart, partially dug in the sides, from the air they appear to be grey moles, peeking above the surface at the green hills beyond, whose view is obscured by the strands of wire which encircle QUAN LOI. The last of the four strands of wire is almost in the valley; beyond it the vegetation begins its slow climb up the next hill.

In day-time one overlooks seventy-five meters of red clay from the bunkers. Beyond the clay the grass is low, making movement easily seen. But at night, when it is cloudy, nothing can be seen beyond ten meters without the aid of illumination.

August 11, 1969 was such a night. Soon the bunker guards from bunkers 61 to 70 reported noises, something in the wire. Some of the men, First Air Cavalry Division personnel, were new arrivals at QUAN LOI, and their nervousness on the eve of an expected attack was understandable. Later the source of the noise was discovered to be a rabbit who had set off a trip flare in the wire.

Except for the Red sector, many bunkers have no radio communication. However, some of them have field telephones. Perhaps some of the damaged bunkers had Starlight scopes, although after the battle none were found in those bunkers. Behind every sector of the bunker line is a decentralized 15 to 20 reaction force which is responsible for those bunkers.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The reaction force is controlled by the sector commander. This reaction force is committed when needed, and need not await orders from the the base defense commander. (2)

It is not enough for the enemy to penetrate the wires and bunkers; the enemy must gain the top of the hill which is protected by the reaction forces. If an enemy attack seriously threatens the bunkers and ready reaction forces, the sector commander can request the perimeter ready reaction force, the 919th Combat Engineers. The Engineer force is two Combat Engineer Vehicles (CEV) armed with 165mm and 50 caliber weapons, and four armored combat assault vehicles (ACAVs) armed with 50 caliber and M-60 machineguns.

At 0105 hours, August 12th, four rockets struck QUAN LOI. The first one landed 100 to 125 meters south of the Blackhorse Air Cavalry Operations bunker; the second one hit 100 meters north of the Operations bunker. The third and fourth rockets hit in the northern part of the compound.

Fifteen minutes later 60mm rounds hit bunkers 67 and 68. (See appendix 1, Annex B). The fire came from a point opposite the bunker on the adjacent hill, so the return fire was drawn away from the Sappers who used wire cutters to silently slip through the defenses. At 0125 hours elements of the K4 Sapper Battalion, 271st VC Regiment begin attacking the other sections. (3)

The guards in bunker 61 probably never saw the enemy, for their weapons were found on safety, not fired. But the noise alerted the reaction force above bunker 61, and they deployed. The Sappers were not able to advance against this fire from above, but maintained automatic fire from a position behind bunker 61 until the reaction force silenced them at 0150 hours.

Soon after bunker 61 was hit, bunker 63 was destroyed by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). The Sapper approached the bunker and fired behind the mesh screen in front of the bunker, which protected it from RPGs. In escaping from bunker 63 the Sapper triggered a trip flare. The light attracted fire from the reaction force and again the enemy advance was halted.

(2) The description of QUAN LOI that appears above the footnote is entirely the compiler's. Although much of it is fairly objective, some subjective understanding is needed. The details on the perimeter defenses and reaction forces were provided by personnel of the base defense commander's office, including a lieutenant who led the reaction force behind bunker 61.

(3) In cases where accounts of personal sources differed considerably, original sources were given precedence, or a necessary judgment on the best source was made.

CONFIDENTIAL

Bunker 65 suffered casualties from enemy small-arms fire. But the light from the trip-flare prevented further enemy penetration and use of grenades or RPGs.

At 0136 hours bunker 59 was hit, signalling a shift in the attack from the Green Sector (bunker 59 to 96, see appendix 1, Annex B) to the 11th ACR Red sector. Since the surprize advantage was lost, the Sappers rushed the Green sector, using Bangalore torpedoes to penetrate the wire. When the wire was blown, however, the intense fire stopped the VC at the wire, and none came beyond it. In the Red sector, the immediate return fire caught the VC in the first strand of wire, and none penetrated beyond it. Twenty-three VC would die in the Red sector by morning, with probably many more killed or wounded, their bodies dragged away by comrades.

At 0205 hours bunker 70 was hit by an RPG which wounded five US. The fight now extended from bunker 55 to bunker 71, along the southern side which divides the Green and Red sectors. Five minutes later the base commander directed medical aid for those areas, and the medics committed most of their vehicles at that time. At 0234 hours bunkers 60 to 70 were hit again with 60mm and small-arms fire. By this time the Blue and White sectors were receiving probes and had enemy forces in the wire and bunkers. Medical aid was directed to those areas by LTC Perri, base defense commander, but all the vehicles were committed. Bunkers 61 to 70 had their communication lines cut, and had no communication with LTC Perri (call sign Lightning 101) or the near-by artillery which could have provided illumination. But the reaction forces used hand-flares and M-79 grenades, which attracted the attention of the 919th Engineers, who deployed without waiting.

Eight medics were in the medical supplies bunker, defending it against the second wave attack, which threatened their position above bunker 61. They did not participate in the attack, however, for several Engineer vehicles arrived to plug that gap; but not before three snipers had slipped past the reaction forces.

The snipers remained hidden until daybreak. One sniper in the tower by the runway was killed shortly after daybreak. Another hid on the roof of the building adjacent to the PX and killed a Vietnamese woman and two children at 0600 hours. He fired upon 11th ACR military intelligence personnel at 0700 hours and was killed by the ARPs at 0730 hours. The other sniper hid in the French village sector and was killed about the same time.

When bunker 70 was destroyed by an RPG at 0205 hours, the Blue sector (bunkers 1 to 29) received a probe. The Sappers killed two in bunker 15, but again the reaction force stopped the advance completely. By 0234 hours the fighting had spread from bunker 15 to 32, from the Blue to the White sector (bunkers 30 to 40). At 0234 hours the radar noticed heavy movement between the Red and White sectors. This may have been the K3 Battalion and Local Forces moving into position to attack the Blue and White sectors. At 0236 hours the radar again noted movement between the Red and White sectors--and a minute later 60mm mortars destroyed bunker 30 and a Cobra helicopter parked on the runway about 150 meters behind bunker 35. At this time LTC Perri directed medics to bunkers 13 to 20, but the medics were committed to bunkers 61 to 70, which had 3 US killed and 16 wounded.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Blue and White sector maintained fire until past daybreak, and the reaction forces prevented a serious breach of the defenses. About 0730 hours three wounded NVA/VCs surrendered by bunkers 15 and 16. About the same time NVA/VC wounded were found by bunkers 60 to 70. In the Red sector, by bunker 55, a POW was taken. (4)

In the 11th ACR Red sector there was one killed, 20 wounded and 23 NVA/VC killed. Three ACAVs and two tanks were moderately damaged, and one tank was destroyed.

b. AN LOC: On 5 August the village was alerted for an attack that never materialized. Intelligence predicted an attack on 11 August, so the Regional Forces were used to build new bunkers and re-build the compound defenses. The MACV compound was re-fenced and new claymore mines and trip flares were set up. New forces were also organized; four platoons were formed with a nucleus of 33% US personnel in each.

During the day of 11 August, AN LOC was quiet, with only the Regional Forces and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group making slight contacts. At 2400 hours AN LOC received word of a contact northwest of LOC NINH, with the Special Forces killing two NVA/VC and wounding several in the 15 minute firefight.

At 0200 hours, August 12, a hamlet north of AN LOC received incoming mortars. Within the next eight minutes eleven new contacts were reported in the area. All attacks were made with small-arms, B-40 rockets and mortars. AN LOC received 107mm rockets, 61mm fire and 82mm mortars until 0100 hours. By 0215 hours eighteen probes had been reported. At 0400 hours the Second of the Ninth Infantry (ARVN) decided to pull back to MINH DUC, although they were the ready reaction force for the area. When the ARVNs made this radio announcement, they went off the US frequency.

E Troop, Second Squadron, 11th ACR had been given the mission of conducting reconnaissance in a two kilometer square west of AN LOC, (See appendix 4 to Annex B) where intelligence had predicted the enemy would deploy and reform after the attack.

-
- (4) Nguyen Van Dueng was captured in the wire at QUAN LOI August 12. The prisoner said he was a member of the C3/K3/A5, also known as the C3 Company, K3 Battalion, 271st VC Regiment and had participated in the attack on QUAN LOI. The K3 Battalion had left the KATUM area on 8 August and arrived at QUAN LOI about 0900 hours on August 11. It waited until after midnight to attack. In July and August Dueng's battalion received over 300 replacements which boosted its strength to 520 men.

CONFIDENTIAL

TF 1-16 was west and northwest, and H Company, 2/11 ACR was south of AN LOC in case of an attack.

At 0430 hours a small NVA propaganda team entered the east gate and passed out leaflets titled, "Now that the US soldiers are leaving, who will protect the ARVN's?" The four man team, according to 2LT Crissman, 11th ACR liaison officer in AN LOC, also took a prisoner, a Vietnamese villager who had worked with the Chieu Hoi program. The message of the leaflets was perhaps too clear to the villagers who had witnessed the ARVN departure. According to the villagers, a large VC force stayed outside the gate. (The villagers have seen every VC force as large in the past). At 0508 hours the VC team left. At 0530 hours the radar reported heavy movement southwest of AN LOC, but the Commander of the 214th Regional Forces, who had committed his force at the east gate as a possible reaction force, reported no contact. At this time the S-2, 11th ACR radioed that a possible battalion sized force might attack. More rockets and mortars came in, but ceased at 0730 hours without an attack. Two hours later, however, 107mm rockets destroyed a Vietnamese home and the jail. Since both rockets struck within 50 meters of the MACV compound and ARVN Headquarters, they were probably the targets.

c. FSB SIDEWINDER: Since its birth on June 6, 1969, FSB SIDEWINDER, a saucer 100 meters in diameter lying in a plain, has been mostly unoccupied. FSB SIDEWINDER, at NT 739821, lies 1.5 kilometers north of FSB ASPEN I, and two kilometers east of MINH DUC, at the intersection of the two roads by its east gate. (See appendix 2 to Annex B).

The circumference is an earth berm, about 4 feet high. Ten meters beyond the berm, across the bare earth the waist-high scrub foliage begins to wood lines 250 to 750 meters beyond, on the north, east, and south side.

Early in August the 15th Armored Cavalry (ARVN) and elements of the 9th Inf Regt (ARVN) occupied FSB SIDEWINDER. With the two troops of armored vehicles and between 250 and 300 men (ARVN) were six liaison personnel from E Troop, 2/11 ACR. The six liaison personnel manned two ACAVs which provided communication with FSB ASPEN I. The ARVN armored personnel stayed in or around their vehicles, the infantrymen slept in tents near the Command Post, a tower in the center of the FSB. The ARVN's built no bunkers, set up no trip flares, and failed to connect the wires to claymores they had set out.

On the night of 11/12 August the ARVN's maintained no listening posts or any other early warning system. The defenses were not integrated; the ARVN armor occupied the east half, the ARVN Infantry occupied the west half of the FSB.

Private First Class William M. Maks, monitoring the radio in an ACAV, received the warning that FSB SIDEWINDER would be attacked at 0100 hours 12 August. The message came from the 11th ACR Tactical Operations Center (TOC), relayed by the Second Squadron TOC. PFC Maks alerted the personnel in the two US ACAVs and prepared for the attack. Twenty minutes later FSB ASPEN I received incoming mortars and returned fire.

CONFIDENTIAL

Tracers from the 50 caliber machineguns flew over FSB Sidewinder; the noise and light woke the sleeping ARVN's and they casually strolled to the top of the berm. They stood there, in their underwear, watching the fireworks at FSB ASPEN I.

At 0135 hours Specialist 4 James A. Clark, the radio operator of the other ACAV, heard the mortars "walking" into the berm. Four fell outside the berm before the range was found and two hit the ARVN Command Post. PFC Maks was temporarily blinded and deafened by the blast while sitting on top of his ACAV which was next to the Command Post.

When the first mortars struck, no one returned fire--literally nothing was done, except wading infantrymen scrambled for clothes and weapons. Since the mortars had the range, the US ACAVs moved to a position by the east gate. One mortar had struck a drum of Mogas and the eerie light silhouetted the VC overrunning the berm in line formation, from the west side. The US personnel fired continually as the ARVN's fled to the east gate, abandoning vehicles in their haste. About 15 ARVN's stayed with E Troop personnel while the ARVN armor and infantry rushed through the east gate. The ARVN's who left headed north for about 300 meters and then began firing into FSB **SIDEWINDER**.

The enemy, the K3 Battalion, 271st VC Regiment, carried few small arms. The VC carried RPGs and satchel charges, moving methodically from vehicle to vehicle, blowing them up. Soon there were several ACAVs, two M48 tanks, and two armored jeeps burning.

At 0241 hours a CH47 Spooky was on station, firing into the perimeter. According to PFC Maks, it probably saved the US personnel. He operated the 50 caliber machinegun while the rest of the ACAV crew tried to repair the 2 M-60 machineguns which had been hit by enemy shells.

"I could see between 75 and 100 VC to shoot at all times," PFC Maks said.

The Spooky expended and was replaced by a Cobra. The VC had moved three 51 caliber machineguns on top of the berm, and placed one by the French house which is fifty meters north of the berm. The machineguns did not fire immediately, but waited for the Cobra to circle lower. The enemy shot it down, but the pilot was later rescued. PFC Maks remembered that some VC manned 50 calibers in empty ACAVs and fired at the helicopter.

Without the protective fire of the Cobra, the two ACAVs could not halt the VC advance. SGT Sinclair, driver of the ACAV beside PFC Maks's ACAV, watched the flanks as PFC Maks fired to the front.

"Watch your right, there are 5 to 7 guys coming, now they are behind you-behind you," SGT Sinclair's voice crackled over the radio. Then only silence, for he had been shot underneath the right arm, just above the flak jacket arm hole, and died instantly.

PFC Maks used his M-16 to kill two of the approaching VC. He killed one caught in the light of an exploding vehicle as he crept to throw a Chicom grenade.

After SGT Sinclair's death the five remaining US decided to leave; however PFC Maks's ACAV was mired. Exploding RPGs by the ACAV seemed to aid the throttle, and the ACAV finally began to move.

CONFIDENTIAL

The explosions by the ACAV caused PFC Maks to drop a M-60 machine-gun, but when he regained his sight, he discovered that it was still on top of the ACAV. The burning vehicles made the movement obvious, and the ACAVs drew fire.

As the ACAVs left the gate, VC in an ammo-carrier began chasing them. One ACAV turned off the road to avoid it. PFC Maks's ACAV headed directly to FSB ASPEN I. Soon it was hit by RPGs and slowed. But fortunately, the ammo-carrier behind it was mistakenly destroyed by RPG rounds from VC outside the gate. The running firefight had been brief, but the RPG and small arms fire was intense.

It seemed to PFC Maks that the ACAV travelled in a continuous explosion. At one point he opened the hatch to find a fire within the ACAV. The driver felt the heat also, and discovered his cushion was burning. As he slowed the vehicle to throw off the burning cushion, the light from the fire drew more RPG rounds. PFC Maks's ACAV made the 1.5 kilometer journey to FSB ASPEN I in 30 minutes, arriving there at 0330 hours. The other ACAV hit a stump and threw a track within 500 meters of FSB ASPEN I, but the personnel made it safely on foot. Of the six from E Troop, one was killed and five were wounded. The two ACAVs took a total of 13 RPG rounds.

E Troop, 2/11 ACR, given the mission of establishing a blocking position west of AN LOC, was on ambush patrol near Highway 13 (XT 760820, XT 773798, XT 768812) when it was ordered to relieve FSB SIDEWINDER.

The CO, 11th ACR directed Second Squadron to send a relief troop to FSB SIDEWINDER. Shortly after this, the liaison personnel lost contact with FSB ASPEN I. E Troop, with its three separated ACAV platoons, was selected to go and each platoon was sent by the most direct path.

1LT Mark J. Wilson, third platoon leader, led his platoon through the rubber trees by bouncing hand-flares off the tree trunks. His platoon approached FSB Sidewinder in column, moving into line formation as the platoon neared the objective. The third platoon swept the south berm area, with the first platoon sweeping the west side. The second platoon went inside, and by 0400 hours E Troop had succeeded in driving off the enemy.

The third platoon found a M41 tank, with a 50 caliber loaded and high explosive round chambered and aimed. The tank was running, and had three ARVN casualties underneath it.

The enemy losses were 45 dead, 3 POWs, and 4 NVA Hoi Chanh. The ARVNs lost 44 killed and 37 wounded. (5)

d. FSB ASPEN I: About 100 meters in diameter, FSB ASPEN I is similar to FSB SIDEWINDER; it has a 4 foot earth berm and one strand of wire around it. It has about 250 meters of visibility around it, with waist-high bushes beyond the wire. On the night of August 11/12, H Company, Second Squadron, 11th ACR, with 7 tanks, 14 ACAVs, and a howitzer battery (C/2-33) defended FSB ASPEN I.

- (5) PFC Maks, SP4 Clark, 1LT Wilson, and other members of E Troop provided interviews for this account, which was verified by LTC Aarestad, former Commander of 2/11 ACR.

CONFIDENTIAL

E Troop, 2/11 ACR had its command post there, along with the Second Squadron Command Post.

At 0140 hours, with everyone on 100% alert, four mortars struck. Before the first sergeant of H Company, 1SG Russel Crowley could yell incoming, the entire perimeter opened up. Two NVA appeared on the top of the berm, but the instant response killed them. The 81mm mortars were followed by RPGs and small-arms fire, but H Company killed 20 VC within 25 meters of the berm and stopped the advance. The firing continued for about ten minutes, with two tanks hit by RPGs.

A tank crew was evacuated and 1SG Crowley replaced the crew with a communications sergeant and a radio operator. Neither had operated a Tank before but learned fast and kept the tank firing until 0600 hours. A Spooky silenced a 51 caliber machinegun near the berm, but drew the fire of four more from the woodline. The artillery illumination exposed the VC running from rubber tree stump to rubber tree stump, approaching the berm to fire RPGs. The Spooky arrived at 0300 hours, and after it expended its load the enemy fire continued only sporadically until the attack ended in the morning.

The VC were well-equipped. They had NVA belts, harness and web-gear on their green and black jungle uniforms. They carried the RPG-2 and RPG-7, plus satchel charges. One prisoner, wounded in the head by fleshettes, carried a ChiCom machinegun.

Elements of E Troop at FSB ASPEN I went to the relief of FSB SIDE-WINDER during the night, and avoided the ChiCom claymore mines which had been placed on each side of the gate. In the morning the mines and wires were found. The wires lead to a command detonated switch about 20 meters across the road from the berm. A dismounted sweep of the area produced 107mm rockets placed on stakes, waiting to be fired.

The K2 Battalion, 271st VC Regiment lost 42 killed, and probably more wounded, for there were many trails of dragged away bodies. The US casualties were 14 were 14 wounded, none killed. (See appendix 3 to Annex B).

e. LOC NINH: Burrowing into the edge of a hill that extends north to south, FSB JON extends along the east side of its base. The runway, which starts at the edge of the hill, easily accommodates the C7A Caribou. The near-by Special Forces/CIDG Camp has a diamond shape. Its bunkers are built into the four feet berm, and connected by trenches which parallel the berm. Beyond the berm 4 strands of wire encircle FSB JON. Among the wires are claymore mines and trip flares. Beyond the wire, close to the woodline, are listening posts. The CIDG and their families have criss-crossed the 400 meter perimeter with tunnels and bunkers. The next door MACV Command Post is almost two stories underground.

Since 7 August the First Squadron, 11th ACR and the 34th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) had conducted reconnaissance in the area to destroy the enemy. The 1/11 ACR's mission was to conduct combined operations to gain contact and destroy the NVA/VC forces threatening LOC NINH. The combined operations were to also secure the populated areas around LOC NINH, and be prepared to counterattack south to AN LOC with a force of two troops.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

On 11 August 1/11 ACR and the 34th Rangers (ARVN) conducted reconnaissance screens, provided liaison with the local populace, established night ambush patrols and provided security for FSBs JON and KELLY. The CIDG forces assisted in these operations. At 1330 hours a D Company tank hit a 40 pound mine that caused no casualties and only moderate damage to the tank at XT 759140. At 2230 hours D/1/11 ACR engaged an unknown-sized enemy force with negative results. (See appendix 6 to Annex B).

On 12 August at 0130 hours D/1/11 ACR received RPG and small-arms fire from an unknown sized enemy force while on ambush patrol outside the village of LOC THUM at XU 728075. Their readiness accounted for 19 NVA dead. D Company suffered one dead and 18 wounded. The enemy was believed to be from the 209th NVA Regiment.

At 0210 hours, when the D Company firefight had barely begun, the 1/11 ACR Command Post received incoming rounds which included 6-60mm mortars, 5 120mm rockets, 3-107mm rockets and RPG rounds. The enemy attempted a ground probe, but was quickly repulsed. Artillery and a LFT supported the brief fight which resulted in one US dead and 12 wounded. The elements of the 209th NVA Regiment suffered 12 NVA dead.

At 1005 hours A Troop, 1/11 ACR made contact with an unknown-sized enemy force at XU 728151. The 34th Rangers (ARVN) reinforced, and although both forces charged the enemy, the contact was lost. At 1205 hours B Company, 1/11 ACR engaged the enemy at XU 770130 with negative results. At 1730 hours the 1/11 ACR Command Post was hit by three 82mm mortars at XU 728057. There were negative casualties or damage, and the results of the counter-fire was unknown.

10. (C) THE COUNTERATTACKS:

a. 12 August:

(1) TF 1-16: On the night of 11/12 August the enemy hit south and east of ALLONS II and TF 1-16 was ordered to implement the counterattack plan for AN LOC. Upon executing the order it almost immediately made contact. When the K6 Battalion, 272d VC Regiment attacked, both companies' command tracks were hit by RPGs. Later D/5-7 Cavalry reinforced TF 1-16. Artillery, LFT, HFT, Blue Man and tactical air was called to strike the enemy as well as likely avenues of escape. The battle continued until 1600 hours when the CO, 11th ACR ordered TF 1-16 to break contact and secure THUNDER IV and ALLONS II in preparation for further attacks on AN LOC. There were two US killed and 27 wounded. Five armored carriers were destroyed, but the enemy left 28 bodies.

(2) TF 2/11: After driving off the enemy, E Troop, 2/11 ACR left FSB SIDEWINDER at 0600 hours on August 12. E Troop continued its mission proceeding up route T via R4 and then to R5. (See appendix 4 to Annex B).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

At 1210 hours E Troop, on line from north to south, made contact with an estimated battalion sized force at XT 710830. The enemy bunker complex, 200 meters long east to west and 75 meters wide north to south, was on the right flank of E Troop. E Troop turned to the right and closed with the enemy, firing on all flanks without restriction. (See Appendix 5 to Annex B).

The terrain favored the elements of the 271st VC Regiment. E Troop entered young rubber, about 14 feet high with red clay and two foot high irrigation berms. The terraced rubber berms provided cover for the enemy. As E Troop turned to the right and advanced, it entered the rubber at the cross grain, rather than the rows. This slowed the advance and made the ACAVs better targets for the RPG teams.

The second platoon was behind the first and to the left; it had to move considerably to reach the enemy. RPG teams fired from the front and rear of the approaching ACAVs. Major Gilbreath, 2/11 S-3, flying command and control, observed many RPGs fired and two ACAVs burning at XT 701837 before the troop commander reported both platoons leaders were hit and the troop could not continue forward.

By this time the Squadron Commander, LTC Aarestad, was on the scene and directed E Troop to the rear while he placed artillery and tactical air on the enemy. E Troop withdrew to XT 71008330 with two ACAVs burning and one left behind at XT 71008300. E Troop then withdrew to LANG NAM at XT 701837 to evacuate the wounded. Cobra gunships and tactical air expended their loads in the area. From 1306 hours August 12 to 0300 hours August 13 a total of 472 rounds of 105mm and 8-inch artillery was fired into the area.

The enemy, believed to be elements of the 271st VC Regiment, sustained 31 killed by ground fire, 12 by artillery and 15 killed by tactical air. The US losses were 4 killed and 38 wounded.

Second Lieutenant Hudkins, platoon leader of second platoon, E Troop, was one of the first ones wounded by RPG fire. The unit medic dressed wounds in his chest and groin. Then 2LT Hudkins was laid down in ACAV E-22 while the medic went for help. The medic never returned. (Due to the large amount of blood lost, the medic probably thought him dead). Late on August 12, 2LT Hudkins moved the ACAV to an unknown location and parked, leaving the engine running throughout the night. Sometime during the day of August 13 2LT Hudkins realized that to be found, he would have to move out from under the rubber. He then moved to coordinates XT 722848 and crawled into the rear of the ACAV to await help.

Major James Bradin, who discovered him, said, " At 1700 hours on 15 August 1969 while on a visual reconnaissance of the AO, I spotted this lone ACAV. My first impulse was that it was part of a reconnaissance unit, but then I realized that there were no other vehicles in the area. Knowing that an ACAV was missing I called a Pink Team to reconnaissance and obtain a bumper number, if possible. 1LT George Adams of the Aero Scout Platoon arrived and quickly identified the vehicle by EVIL 22 painted on the 50 caliber gunshield. The ARPs were inserted and 2LT Hudkins was evacuated to the 15th Medical Company."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

H Company, 2/11 ACR, with two tank platoons and one ACAV platoon of F Troop left FSB ASPEN I at 0000 hours August 12 and proceeded up route Z to reconnoiter the R5 and R6 area. In proceeding up route Z, H Company had to fight its way in and out of MINH DUC, making a passage through the 15th Armored Cavalry (ARVN) which had a troop in sporadic contact near the town.

At 1425 hours August 12, H Company was ordered into the E Troop contact area (XT 710830) to recover the dead. H Company entered the area, drew RPG fire, and returned fire. Later it was ordered to withdraw to allow an air strike to hit the area. H Company was then ordered to return to FSB ASPEN I to secure it because the weather conditions prohibited air support and the command and control ship was not available. The Company suffered one dead and 8 wounded during the day's operations.

F Troop, 2/11 ACR on another mission had a contact simultaneous with the E Troop contact. F Troop and convoy escort elements of the First Infantry Division accompanying a convoy moving north from LAI KHE were blocked by a blown culvert and ambushed at XT 765750. F Troop's mission was to escort the convoy from THUNDER III north and outpost the road north of grid line 77.

While an ALVB bridge was dispatched from FSB ASPEN I, the Second Squadron Commander coordinated artillery, tactical air and ground maneuver elements allowing the convoy to pass the culvert and the attempted enemy ambush. The enemy, believed to be elements of the 101D NVA Regiment, suffered 55 killed by the joint effort. F Troop suffered two killed.

b. 13 August:

(1) TF 1-16: On 13 August A and C Company made light contacts with elements of the 272d VC Regiment west of AN LOC (XT 717094). This Regiment had suffered heavy losses the night before and was not prepared to fight. They withdrew, using evasive tactics to hide in the rubber. After dusting off the two US wounded, TF 1-16 continued to sweep the area to regain contact. During the sweep 1-16 found 16 NVA bodies killed in the previous day's action.

(2) D Company, 1/11 ACR: On 13 August D Company made contact with the enemy at XU 695007. D Company received small-arms and intense RPG fire as they closed the enemy. The 34th Rangers (ARVN) rushed to the right flank during the running firefight in which the 34th Rangers and A Company repeatedly kept the enemy in a three-sided box. Artillery and a LFT prevented the enemy's mass withdrawal. The elements of the KC Battalion, 209th NVA Regiment suffered 77 killed. 36 NVA killed were credited to D Company, 35 killed were credited to the 34th Rangers (ARVN) and 6 killed were credited to helicopters. The US suffered two killed and six wounded. The ARVNs suffered two wounded.

ANNEX A to Battle of Northern BINH LONG Province Combat After Action Report.

The following intelligence maps depict probable movement of enemy forces, as referred to in the Intelligence section.

- Appendix 1 - Enemy movement around QU LOC.
- Appendix 2 - Enemy movement around LOC HINH.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: _____




CONFIDENTIAL

Record Copy to Replace Unstable Original
Property of the National Archives

DECLASSIFIED
1/25/87 JMD 872

CONFIDENTIAL

5/2/71
11/2/71
75 AG/ARVN



CONFIDENTIAL


Record Copy to Replace Unstable Original
Property of the National Archives

DECLASSIFIED
1/10/87

Province After Action Report.

CONFIDENTIAL

The following maps illustrate the movement of enemy forces to attack positions.




CONFIDENTIAL

Record Copy to Replace Unstable Original
Property of the National Archives

DECLASSIFIED
Agency: DMP 875 501


CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Record Copy to Replace Unstable Original
Property of the National Archives

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: DMP 875 511
 1/1




Record Copy to Replace Unstable Original
Property of the National Archives

DECLASSIFIED
 Agency MM 8735

Record Copy to Replace Unstable Original
Property of the National Archives

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 87541

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526

CONFIDENTIAL



Record Copy to Replace Unstable Original
Property of the National Archives

ANNEX B to Battle of Northern BINH LONG Province Combat After Action Report.

These Operation maps depict battle sites of the attacks described in the sections attack and counterattacks.


- Appendix 1 - QUAN LOI Attack
- Appendix 2 - FSB SIDEWINDER Attack
- Appendix 3 - FSB ASPEN I Attack
- Appendix 4 - E Troop 2/11 ACR Counterattack mission
- Appendix 5 - E Troop 2/11 ACR Contact
- Appendix 6 - Areas of Operation

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

U MD 876 501

CONFIDENTIAL



TOTAL STATISTICS:

- 4 US KIA
- 37 US WIA
- 73 NVA KIA
- 3 NVA PW
- 3 CHIEU HOI


- A - heavy movement 150 meters at 0151 hrs
- B - heavy movement 460 meters at 0137 hrs
- C - heavy movement at 0146 hrs
- D - heavy movement at 0426 hrs

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 876 501

E TROOP/ SECOND SQUADRON
121200 AUGUST 1969

CONFIDENTIAL



NOTE:

Initially, Third Platoon (on the right) detected movement, saw a fleeting figure, and opened fire. Moving forward the platoon made a turning movement to the right, heading directly south. The Third Platoon was directed to move up on the left. After a two to four minute lull following intense rifle and arms fire, the assaulting elements came under heavy fire from numerous RPG teams, and possibly machinegun fire. Elements of the Second Platoon moved up to protect the left flank. At this point the assault was halted, E Troop having sustained 43 total casualties and 7 ACAV's hit by RPG's.


APPENDIX 5 to ANNEX B

CONFIDENTIAL

Record Copy to Replace Unstable Original
Property of the National Archives

Record Copy to Replace Unstable Original
Property of the National Archives

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 873 541

CONFIDENTIAL




Enemy mined road here.

North

DEFENSE 11-12 August 69:

- Tank
- ACAV
- AVIL
- Howitzer




CONFIDENTIAL

Record Copy to Replace Unstable Original
Property of the National Archives

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 87C 501

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Aspen

NOTE:

- Denotes ACAV
- ▲ Denotes TANK
- Denotes truck or jeep
- Destroyed vehicles

NOT TO SCALE

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 2 - ANEX 2

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: 11/1/00

NATIONAL ARCHIVES

CONFIDENTIAL

DIVISION OF AREA OF OPERATIONS

• LOC NIHN

TASK FORCE WRIGHT

OO

4/9th ARVN INF 1/16 MECH

4/9th+1/16th

• QUAN LOI

4/9+1/16

15

• AN LOC

2/9th

15

• ASPEN

2/11th ACR

NOTE: NOT DRAWN TO SCALE

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: UIM 873 541

ANNEX C to Battle of Northern BINH LONG Province Combat After Action Report.

The following FRAGO's are appropriate to the battle:

FRAGO 14 to OPOD 6-69 (Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR) (U)
FRAGO 15 to OPOD 6-69 (Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR) (U)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

VMP 873 541

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy _____ of 40 Copies
HQ, 11th Armd Cav Regt
QUAN LOI (XT 8290) RVN
081700H August 1969

Frago 14 to OPOFD 6-69 (Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR) (U)

TASK ORGANIZATION

TF WRIGHT	TF 2/11 ACR	TF 1/16	Regt Con
1/11 ACR	E/2/11 ACR	A Co, 1/16	Air Cav Trp
B/1-9 Cav (DS)	F/2/11 ACR	C Co, 1/16	919th Engr (-)
	H/2/11 ACR	A Trp, 1/4	HQ, 6-27 Arty
			How/1/11 ACR
			How/2/11 ACR
			C/2/33 Arty
			C/2-13 Arty (GS)
			A/3-197 Arty (GS)
			A/6/27 Arty (GS)
			F/16 Arty (GS)

1. (C) SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces: See current INTSUM.

b. Friendly Forces: ARVN Task Organization:

(1) TF 15	TF 4/9	TF 2/1
15 Cav (-)	4/9 Inf	2/1 Cav
1/9 Inf (-)	One Trp 15 Cav	One Co, 9 Inf
1 Plat 105mm How	1 Plat 105mm How	Recon Co, 9 Inf
		1 Plat 105mm How
		1 Plat 155mm How

34th Rangers Bn (ARVN) TF BINH LONG Sub Sector
2/9 ARVN (-)
1 Plat 105mm How
1 Plat 155mm How

(2) CO, 9th Regt ARVN commands all ARVN forces in 11th ACR's AO. All RF/ PF forces in 11th ACR's AO are OPCON to ARVN Commanders in sector.

(3) TF 15 conducts ground reconnaissance to locate and destroy NVA/VC forces in AO (see overlay). TF 15 assists counter attack of 2/11 on order.

(4) TF 4/9 establishes joint CP with 1/16 Inf (Mech) and conducts ground reconnaissance in AO (see overlay) to locate and destroy NVA/VC forces threatening AN LOC.

(5) TF BINH LONG Sub Sector coordinates defense of AN LOC using 2/9 ARVN

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 4
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

UMP 873 541

✓

Aug 10

CONFIDENTIAL

FRAGO 14 to OPORD 6-69 (Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR) (U)

(-) and RF/PF forces in sector (see overlay).

(6) 34th Ranger Bn conducts combined operations with 1/11 under the supervision of TF WRIGHT.

(7) TF 2/1 secures CHON THANH, conducts ground reconnaissance vic CHON THANH and outposts QL 13 during daylight hours with one Company, 1/9 ARVN.

(8) 211 RF Co continues to outpost QL 13 during daylight hours.

2. (C) MISSION; 11th ACR in cooperation with RVNAF forces reposition forces, adjusts sectors, conducts ground and air reconnaissance to locate and destroy NVA/VC forces in AO, and prepares for the defenses of AN LOC/ LOC NINH.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations:

(1) 11th ACR and RVNAF conduct air and ground reconnaissance and establish strong points vic AN LOC/LOC NINH to locate and destroy NVA/VC forces moving into the 11th ACR AO for an attack on these cities. TF WRIGHT covers northern portion AO (LOC NINH); TF 1/16, TF 4/9, TF BINH LONG Province, and TF 15 cover central portion of AO; and TF 2/11 cover southern portion of AO.

(2) Fires: See Annex A (Fire Support)

b. TF WRIGHT:

(1) Conduct combined operations in assigned sector (see overlay) to gain contact with and destroy NVA/VC forces threatening LOC NINH.

(2) Secure populated areas vic LOC NINH.

(3) Be prepared to counter attack south to AN LOC with a force of 3 troops.

c. TF 1/16:

(1) Conduct combined operations with TF 4/9 in AO (see overlay) to gain contact with and destroy NVA/VC forces threatening AN LOC.

(2) Secure FSB THUNDER IV during hours of darkness.

(3) Secure populated areas vic AN LOC.

(4) In conjunction with TF 4/9 prepare plans for counter attack in AO.

d. TF 2/11:

(1) Continue to secure convoys on QL 13 in conjunction with RVNAF

(2) Secure THUNDER III during hours of darkness.

(3) During hours of darkness secure bridge and culvert vic XT 756800 and conduct ambushes to detect NVA/VC forces attempting to strike these facilities and the hamlets of DUC VINH (XT 763815) and DUC LOI (XT 763807).

(4) Establish Jump CP in AO.

(5) Maintain at least two 4.2" mortar tracks at QUAN LOI in support of Base Defense.

(6) Establish FSB in AO using C/2/33 Arty.

(7) Exchange liaison officer with 15 Cav Regt ARVN and make maximum

Page 2 of 3 Pages.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

100 873 541

coordination with RVNAF forces in AO.

(8) Be prepared to place one troop OPCON 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) for operations east of QL 13.

(9) In conjunction with 15th Cav ARVN prepare plans for counter attack in 15th Cav AO and ~~relieve~~ AN LOC from the south.

e. Air Cav Trp:

(1) Conduct intensive aerial reconnaissance with priority to portion of AO west of AN LOC.

(2) Be prepared to accept OPCON B/1-9 Cav,

f. 919 Engr: No change

4. ADMIN & SIGNAL:

a. Call signs and frequencies of ARVN units:

(1) 9th Regt CMD NET: Pri LUSH TAPES 55.75
Alt DELUX PATRON 36.20

(2) Bn NCS's of the 9th Regt

Bn	Pri	Alt
1/9	12	57
2/9	22	27
4/9	52	77

(3) 15 Cav CMD NET: Pri MYSTIC REFUND 32.30
Alt BOURBON STAMPS 44.10

(4) 34 Ranger Bn (ARVN) Pri RIBBON TRICK 20 40.00-55.80
Alt SILENT CRAMP 37 30.00-36.90

b. FRAGO effective 081700H August 1969.

Acknowledge

LEACH
COL

ANNEX:

A - Fire Support
B - Opns Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPORD 6-69

OFFICIAL

/s/ BROOKSHIRE
BROOKSHIRE
S3

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

U M 875 541

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy _____ of 40 Copies
HQ, 11th Armd Cav Regt
QUAN LOI (XT 8290) RVN
081700H August 1969

Frago 14 to OPORD 6-69 (Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR) (U)

TASK ORGANIZATION

TF WRIGHT	TF 2/11 ACR	TF 1/16	Regt Con
1/11 ACR	E/2/11 ACR	A Co, 1/16	Air Cav Trp
B/1-9 Cav (DS)	F/2/11 ACR	C Co, 1/16	919th Engr (-)
	H/2/11 ACR	A Trp, 1/4	HQ, 6-27 Arty
			How/1/11 ACR
			How/2/11 ACR
			C/2/33 Arty
			C/2-13 Arty (GS)
			A/3-197 Arty (GS)
			A/6/27 Arty (GS)
			F/16 Arty (GS)

1. (C) SITUATION:

- a. Enemy Forces: See current INTSUM.
- b. Friendly Forces: ARVN Task Organization:

(1) TF 15	TF 4/9	TF 2/1
15 Cav (-)	4/9 Inf	2/1 Cav
1/9 Inf (-)	One Trp 15 Cav	One Co, 9 Inf
1 Plat 105mm How	1 Plat 105mm How	Recon Co, 9 Inf
		1 Plat 105mm How
		1 Plat 155mm How

34th Rangers Bn (ARVN) TF BINH LONG Sub Sector
2/9 ARVN (-)
1 Plat 105mm How
1 Plat 155mm How

(2) CO, 9th Regt ARVN commands all ARVN forces in 11th ACR's AO. All RF/PF forces in 11th ACR's AO are OPCON to ARVN Commanders in sector.

(3) TF 15 conducts ground reconnaissance to locate and destroy NVA/VC forces in AO (see overlay). TF 15 assists counter attack of 2/11 on order.

(4) TF 4/9 establishes joint CP with 1/16 Inf (Mech) and conducts ground reconnaissance in AO (see overlay) to locate and destroy NVA/VC forces threatening AN LOC.

(5) TF BINH LONG Sub Sector coordinates defense of AN LOC using 2/9 ARVN

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 4
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

JMD 873 541

CONFIDENTIAL

FRAGO 14 to OPOD 6-69 (Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR) (U)

(-) and RF/PF forces in sector (see overlay).

(6) 34th Ranger Bn conducts combined operations with 1/11 under the supervision of TF WRIGHT.

(7) TF 2/1 secures CHON THANH, conducts ground reconnaissance vic CHON THANH and outposts QL 13 during daylight hours with one Company, 1/9 ARVN.

(8) 211 RF Co continues to outpost QL 13 during daylight hours.

2. (C) MISSION; 11th ACR in cooperation with RVNAF forces reposition forces, adjusts sectors, conducts ground and air reconnaissance to locate and destroy NVA/VC forces in AO, and prepares for the defenses of AN LOC/ LOC NINH.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations:

(1) 11th ACR and RVNAF conduct air and ground reconnaissance and establish strong points vic AN LOC/LOC NINH to locate and destroy NVA/VC forces moving into the 11th ACR AO for an attack on these cities. TF WRIGHT covers northern portion AO (LOC NINH); TF 1/16, TF 4/9, TF BINH LONG Province, and TF 15 cover central portion of AO; and TF 2/11 cover southern portion of AO.

(2) Fires: See Annex A (Fire Support)

b. TF WRIGHT:

(1) Conduct combined operations in assigned sector (see overlay) to gain contact with and destroy NVA/VC forces threatening LOC NINH.

(2) Secure populated areas vic LOC NINH.

(3) Be prepared to counter attack south to AN LOC with a force of 3 troops.

c. TF 1/16:

(1) Conduct combined operations with TF 4/9 in AO (see overlay) to gain contact with and destroy NVA/VC forces threatening AN LOC.

(2) Secure FSB THUNDER IV during hours of darkness.

(3) Secure populated areas vic AN LOC.

(4) In conjunction with TF 4/9 prepare plans for counter attack in AO.

d. TF 2/11:

(1) Continue to secure convoys on QL 13 in conjunction with RVNAF

(2) Secure THUNDER III during hours of darkness.

(3) During hours of darkness secure bridge and culvert vic XT 756800 and conduct ambushes to detect NVA/VC forces attempting to strike these facilities and the hamlets of DUC VINH (XT 763815) and DUC LOI (XT 763807).

(4) Establish Jump CP in AO.

(5) Maintain at least two 4.2" mortar tracks at QUAN LOI in support of Base Defense.

(6) Establish FSB in AO using C/2/33 Arty.

(7) Exchange liaison officer with 15 Cav Regt ARVN and make maximum

Page 2 of 3 Pages.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

UMP 873 541

CONFIDENTIAL

FRAGO 14 to OPOD 6-69 (Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR) (U)

coordination with RVNAF forces in AO.

(8) Be prepared to place one troop OPCON 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) for operations east of QL 13.

(9) In conjunction with 15th Cav ARVN prepare plans for counter attack in 15th Cav AO and relative AN LOC from the south.

e. Air Cav Trp:

(1) Conduct intensive aerial reconnaissance with priority to portion of AO west of AN LOC.

(2) Be prepared to accept OPCON B/1-9 Cav,

f. 919 Engr: No change

4. ADMIN & SIGNAL:

a. Call signs and frequencies of ARVN units:

(1) 9th Regt CMD NET: Pri LUSH TAPES 55.75
Alt DELUX PATRON 36.20

(2) Bn NCS's of the 9th Regt
Bn Pri Alt
1/9 12 57
2/9 22 27
4/9 52 77

(3) 15 Cav CMD NET: Pri MYSTIC REFUND 32.30
Alt BOURBON STAMPS 44.10

(4) 34 Ranger Bn (ARVN) Pri RIBBON TRICK 20 40.00-55.80
Alt SILENT CRAMP 37 30.00-36.90

b. FRAGO effective 081700H August 1969.

Acknowledge

LEACH
COL

ANNEX:

- A - Fire Support
- B - Opns Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPOD 6-69

OFFICIAL

/s/ BROOKSHIRE
BROOKSHIRE
S3

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NMP 873 541

CONFIDENTIAL


Annex A (Fire Support) to FRAGO 14 to OPOD 6-69 (Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR) (U)

1. (C) Artillery control provided by 6th Bn, 27th ARTY TOC. Location QUAN LOI (call sign SERENE METHOD 37, Freq - 52.20.
2. (C) Direct Fire Support provided by organic Howitzer Battery, location TBA.
3. (C) General Fire Support provided by:
 - a. A/6/27 Arty, 8"-175mm, location XT812906.
 - b. B/6/27 Arty, 8"-175mm, location XW143072.
4. (C) Calls for fire will be sent to 6/27 Arty TOC or direct to the individual battery concerned, over assigned frequencies:
 - a. How Btry 1/11ACRM NORTON STUMPS 71, Freq 56.80.
 - b. How Btry 2/11ACR, STORM GAUZE 78, Freq 54.60.
 - c. A/6/27 Arty, SERENE METHOD 59, Freq 52.20.
 - d. B/6/27 Arty, SERENE METHOD 69, Freq 52.20.
 - e. ARVN Arty; through SF; HOUSE CHISEL, Freq 66.40.
 - f. ARVN Artys; through Sector; PALLID INSULTS, Freq 53.70.
 - g. HQ/6/27 Arty, SERENE METHOD 37, Freq 52.20.
 - h. F/16 Arty, SERENE METHOD 99, Freq 54.20.
 - i. A/3/197 Arty, SPACE DRUGS 59, Freq 60.30.
 - j. C/2/13 Arty, SIDNEY ATLAS 79, Freq 54.60.
 - k. C/2/33 Arty, DUNGEON CHARLIE, Freq 60.30.
5. (C) All movements will be covered by an Aerial Observer, and will be preceded by a rolling artillery barrage in dense vegetation and likely ambush sites.
6. (C) A Forward Air Controller (FAC) will also fly column cover for coordination of air assets.
7. (C) Requests for Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) will be processed through 6/27 Arty TOC.

GROUP 4
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS


Page 1 of 1 page

CONFIDENTIAL



ANNEX B
TO FRAGO 14 TO OPORD 6-69
OPERATION KENTUCKY COUGAR
MAP REF: 1:50,000 RVN

CONFIDENTIAL



DECLASSIFIED
Authority: AMP 873 541

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy ___ of 10 Copies
HQ, 11th Arm Cav Regt
QUAN LOI (8290) RVN
120400H August 1969

FRAGO 15 to OPOD 6-69 (Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR) (U)

1. (C) MISSIONS:

a. TF 1/16 Inf (Tech):

(1) Remain OPCODE 11th ACR.

(2) Displace one company by Route A to vic blocking position G6.

Recon w/in the 4 sq km grid (2 kms on a side) centered on XT6891. Give initial emphasis to NW corner of that box.

(3) Piggy back D-5/7 to vic of 4 sq km grid (2 kms on a side) entered on XT6889. Screen, facing east, the entire box from N to S.

(4) Displace one company by Route A to vic blocking position G1.

Recon in 4 sq km grid (2 kms on a side) around XT7288. Hook into this AO from west to east.

b. TF 2/11 ACR:

(1) Displace one troop via Route Z to vic blocking position R5.

Recon, S to N, within the 4 sq km grid (2 kms on a side) centered on XT7086.

(2) Displace one troop via Route T to Blocking position R6.

Recon S to NW in the 4 sq km grid (2 kms of a side) around XT6887.

(3) Escort convoy from 77 E-W grid line to QUAN LOI with 2 platoons. 1st Inf Div will escort convoy north to that line.

c. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Attack at 0600 hours to regain contact.

(2) If no contact is made, upon arrival in objective area break into platoon - sized elements and recon in areas.

2. This FRAGO effective 120500H August.

Acknowledge

LEACH
COL

ANNEX 1 - Diagram

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPOD 6-69


OFFICIAL

GROUP 4
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS

/s/ BROOKSHIRE
BROOKSHIRE
S3


Page 1 of 1 Page

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A
FRAGG 15



CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: ND 870 501

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX D to Battle of Northern BINH LONG Province Combat After Action Report.

The following is the culmative statistics on the attacks during 11 - 13 August.

1. US Losses:

a. Personnel: 19 Killed
226 Wounded

b. Equipment: 2 UH/2s moderately damaged 6 M48A3 heavy damage
6 ACAVs moderately damaged 4 M48A3 combat loss
30 ACAVs combat loss 1 ALVB moderately dama
1 M48A3 lightly damaged 1 Road Grader combat l
2 M48A3 moderately damaged 1 M551 combat loss

2. Enemy Losses

a. Personnel: 544 Killed
21 PWs

b. Equipment: 10 Bangalore Torpedoes 6 ChiCom Claymore Mines
88 B-40 rounds 1 107mm rounds
18 B-41 rounds 12 AK-47s
66 RPG Boosters 1292 AK-47 rounds
10 RPG-2 Launchers 2100 7.62mm rounds (link type)
8 RPG-7 Launchers 1 51 caliber tripod
19 RPG-2 rounds 1 US Frag Grenade
5 RP rounds Medical supplies
1 60mm rounds 12 66mm rounds
146 ChiCom Grenades

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority